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script attribution that one would expect"? In how many cases the manuscripts themselves, a great many of which have been studied by Andreae and Bülbring, assign the work to Rolle, Miss Allen is unable to say; "a thorough examination of the dialect of the *Prick of Conscience* and the other works ascribed to Rolle has not been made"; and "in the consideration of vocabulary and phraseology there are elements present that render that part of the inquiry somewhat unfruitful"; she adds: "the subject matter is so unlike as to explain many differences of this sort." The author's modifications of these concessions we cannot enter into here. However modified or interpreted, they mean that Miss Allen's valuable paper leaves something to be desired. What she has accomplished is a careful examination of a considerable part of the evidence which bears upon Rolle's supposed authorship of the *Prick of Conscience*. H. S. V. JONES.

TRUTH AND REALITY. An introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. By John Elof Boodin. The Macmillan Company. New York. 1911, pp. VIII-334.

Philosophic discussion of the past decade has centered pretty largely in the question of truth. Professor Boodin's book is a well-written and interesting contribution to this discussion. In its aims it is constructive and expository rather than polemic. The author attempts to give, from the standpoint of the "new realism," a presentation of the problem which recognizes the truth of rival theories and avoids their difficulties. As point of departure he takes the results of modern biology and psychology, which are presented in stimulating fashion; after which he takes up in order *The Nature of Truth*, *The Criterion of Truth*, and *Truth and its Object*. Limitations of space make it necessary to omit from present consideration much that is of interest and merit, in order to give proper attention to the matters which are fundamental in Professor Boodin's book.

What is truth? The endeavor to answer this question leads at once into the endless ramifications and technicalities of philosophic controversy. To the outsider all these attacks and counter-attacks may seem to embody the acme of academic barrenness and futility. Some permanent results, however, seem to have been secured, albeit largely of a negative sort. The notion that truth is a process of duplication or copying has been generally discarded as impracticable. Truth as an "agreement" between an idea and its object is likewise empty, unless agreement can be explained in detail and in the concrete. The pragmatic doctrine that truth is the function

whereby one experience leads on or guides or points to a further experience has won considerable approval and meets with sympathetic treatment on the part of Professor Boodin. He agrees that the concept of truth has meaning only when considered with reference to an intelligence. A truth that exists eternal and immutable, independent of all minds, is a fiction of the intellect which mistakes abstractions for realities. "Truth is our version of reality. It is nonsense to speak of an hypothesis, which is our meaning or attitude, as true previous to verification" (p. 228). "What we mean [by agreement] is what science always has insisted, viz. that the consequences which follow from the hypothesis, or the constitution of the object *as we have conceived it* on the basis of past experience shall tally with the consequences *in dealing with the object*, or with further experience, formal or empirical, according to the problem set. There is no such thing as agreement in the abstract; no way of finding out the truth of an idea by merely examining its eternal fitness in general" (p. 189).

But if truth is not an affair of copying, nor yet something self-existent and sacro-sanct, neither is it for Professor Boodin simply the function whereby an experience anticipates and leads on to a further experience. At this point, to be sure, it is necessary to proceed with some caution, for the exposition is not wholly direct and unambiguous. In one connection the statement is made that "there can be no ultimate difference between truth and the test of truth," also that "it is the intent as terminating in the selected facts which constitutes the truth" (p. 197). But on the other hand, the notion of truth as "agreement" is not wholly surrendered. Validity is defined as "the agreement of an idea or belief with its reality" (p. 210). The pragmatic theory, which construes truth wholly in instrumental terms, i. e. in terms of the process whereby we pass from a given experience to a certain other experience, is convicted of inadequacy, on the ground that this view confines the range of truth to the merely individual experience. The significance of this criticism is that "individual experience" is evidently regarded as a stream of "states," isolated from the rest of the world. It is only on the basis of this assumption that the criticism of the instrumental theory of knowledge has any force. For instrumentalism "the question is merely how the facts *seem* to us; how they can be controlled by us; whether our concepts terminate in perceptions. Not so in the knowledge of the sharing type. Here the truth attitude is not merely an artificial tool, like an astronomical ellipse or a census table. It is not a piecemeal selection of external qualities and relations which are serviceable as leadings to

the concrete processes which we strive to anticipate and control. We must imitate, not merely externally, but share and acknowledge, soul confronting soul, the individual's own meaning in its unique wholeness. Only when social communication of mind with mind results in such sympathy and copying do we have real knowledge of selves. In so far as the knowing attitude here can be completely realized, it is no longer *of* reality; but it is reality. To know the meaning of Hamlet is to have the reality of Hamlet. Leibniz's monads are a splendid illustration of a universe which might exist in many copies" (p. 220).

According to Professor Boodin the doctrine of pragmatism or instrumentalism furnishes at best but a partial explanation of truth. It is an error to suppose that "truth exists solely for the sake of satisfying certain demands extraneous to itself, for example the biological end of adjustment. Truth sometimes finds its inspiration in such practical demands, but it sometimes finds its motive in scientific curiosity..... Truth as a matter of fact must always be imitative of its object to a certain extent" (p. 193). This is not the place to debate whether the appeal to scientific curiosity proves the existence of knowledge which is not instrumental in character. Whatever its shortcomings, the position of instrumentalism has an attractive definiteness and concreteness. But since instrumentalism is said not to cover the whole ground, the question recurs, what, precisely, is the relation between the true idea and its object?

To this question the reviewer is unable to find consistent and unambiguous answer. As already indicated, the author makes certain concessions to the instrumental point of view. These concessions, however, seem to place his argument in a certain predicament. The charge that the instrumental test of truth restricts the scope of truth to "individual experience" has been made very often, and always for the same reason, viz. that the theory provides no avenue of escape from the stream of subjective states. If, however, instrumentalism is really guilty of postulating the existence of such a stream, it is unable to justify the claim of any experience to be true. From such a standpoint the treatment of the problem must necessarily end in scepticism; and we might reasonably expect a writer like Professor Boodin to avoid entering into an entangling alliance with a position which has so often been tried and found wanting in the past. But on the other hand, if instrumentalism has not committed this offense, the criticism urged against it falls to the ground.

The author's treatment of instrumentalism is but one among several indications that he holds to more than one stand-

ard or criterion of truth. Instrumentalism is good enough, "as far as it goes." In other contexts, however, "agreement" or "correspondence" or "imitation" comes to the front. These terms are meant to indicate a relation which is indeed to be tested by results, but which is something different from verifiability or from the process of verification itself. Again, when we operate on the plane of social meanings, the true idea and its object are identical. "To know the meaning of Hamlet is to have reality of Hamlet." Idealistic propaganda, however, has long since robbed such statements of their charm. Assertions of identity have become as familiar and as uninspiring as the generalizations of a political platform. The affirmation of an identity between thought and its object is not really significant until it is developed and made concrete on the side of its metaphysical implications.

In so brief a review it is impossible to do justice to the genuine merits of the book. In point of style and arrangement it is to be highly commended. The discussions frequently impress the reader with their fairness and insight, as also with a certain freshness and aptness of presentation. It is a hopeful sign that present-day realism, of which the author professes himself an adherent, is beginning to put forth sustained treatments of the problems which are at present of cardinal importance in the field of philosophy.

University of Illinois.

B. H. BODE.